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Investor Sentiment and Stock Returns: Evidence from the Athens 
Stock Exchange 
Demetrios James Gizelis          Shah Saeed Hassan Chowdhury 
Abstract 
A plethora of academic research has been under way investigating the effect of individual 
investor sentiment on stock returns.  It seems that the issue is not resolved yet because the 
empirical findings are not entirely conclusive.  Most authors argue that there is a place for 
sentiment as a determining factor in the stock return generating process while several others find 
that it is exactly the opposite. This paper aims at contributing to the existing debate by examining 
the relationship between investor sentiment and stock market returns of firms listed in the Athens 
Stock Exchange.  We employ two investor sentiment proxies, a direct and an indirect. As the 
direct measurement of sentiment we use the historical investor sentiment indicators compiled by 
the European Commission, and for the indirect one we resort to the closed-end equity fund 
discount/premium.  Using monthly data for the period January 1995 to April 2014 the regression 
results indicate that investor sentiment weakly explains returns.  Because this type of risk is not 
diversifiable, for practical purposes somehow it ought to be priced.  Thus, it appears that 
behavioral factors may be considered in empirical asset pricing models for the Greek market.  
Keywords: Investor sentiment, Greek stock market, Return predictability  
 
I.     Introduction   
In neoclassical finance theory there is typically no place for investor sentiment because, it is 
argued, share valuation reflects only fundamentals and nothing else. From its inception 
traditional financial theorists have either ignored sentiment as a risk factor or have assumed it 
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away, on the grounds that in perfectly competitive financial markets irrational trading behavior 
will be quickly washed away. The tenets on which this conclusion is drawn are: firstly, financial 
markets are informationally efficient and secondly, market participants are rational.  
           
The requirement of market efficiency, therefore, becomes one of the two foundations of modern 
financial economics and its presence guarantees that in equilibrium asset prices embody all 
available information regarding the fundamental value of the underlying security. In the absence 
of market frictions, then, the price of marketable securities is equal to their intrinsic value, which 
is defined as the sum of present value of all expected cash flows.  Thus, in an efficient market 
security prices instantaneously reflect all relevant information and this makes prediction of future 
prices based on past and present information futile, because they just follow a random walk.
1
  
           
The second foundation of modern financial theory is the assertion that individual investors 
behave rationally, which implies that in their decision making calculus they take into 
consideration and rely on all available relevant information they have access to. Rationality in 
financial markets is based on the hypothesis of rational expectations found in economic theory, 
which states that the predictions of economic agents regarding the future value of an asset are not 
systematically biased, that is, errors are not correlated.
2
    
          
 Introducing in the model the additional factors of investors pursuing their own self-interest and 
the forces of arbitrage, classical financial theory formulates its final argument that irrational 
participants will be quickly expelled from the market and with them the opportunities of making 
                                                          
1 This pattern of security prices movement is postulated by the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which initially was 
formalized by Samuelson (1965) and popularized by Fama (1970, 1976).  
2
 Statistically, this is equivalent to saying that the individual predictions will be normally distributed around their expected value. 
This way of modeling expectations was originally proposed by Muth (1961) and was further developed by Lucas (1972) and 
Sargent & Wallace (1975) as a reaction to inherent flaws of theories based on adaptive expectations. 
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risk-free profits. The issue, however, is that in the real world investors are constrained on their 
arbitrage activities due to the fact that financial markets are not frictionless. This is so because in 
order to earn risk-free profit professional arbitrageurs must use substantial funds, which means 
that this activity automatically is exposed to risk.  Moreover, because of the presence of 
transaction cost, information gathering cost, and financing cost arbitrageurs become very 
skeptical and to a large extent are discouraged from exploiting market mispricing. Therefore, 
arbitrage does not necessarily operate toward eliminating market anomalies (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997). 
           
The persistent presence of security mispricing and unexploited arbitrage opportunities, which are 
manifested  in financial puzzles such as the closed-end fund discount, January Anomaly, the 
weekend effect, and IPO underpricing as well as the periodic occurrence of financial crises has 
led a group of theorists to search for alternative explanations for these market anomalies. One 
approach is resorting to non-economic factors, such as investor behavior, that bypass the strict 
rationality assumption and the presence of arbitrage of the conventional finance paradigm. More 
specifically, this practice has been advocated by proponents of behavioral finance, who posit that 
some market participants may exhibit irrational characteristics and through their conduct could 
affect market outcome, asset prices, and possibly the conduct of other investors. In this 
framework, investor sentiment becomes a key factor that can explain the presence of market 
distortions, such as limited arbitrage, which make asset prices diverge from equilibrium. 
           
Proponents of behavioral finance have advocated that in real markets arbitrageurs are also 
constrained by the presence of “noise” traders, whose unconventional behavior increases risk 
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exposure for all participants, and therefore they (arbitrageurs) are not willing to expose 
themselves to excessive non-diversifiable risks. These noise traders are usually small individual 
investors with minimum or without any investment training and hence their behavior is not 
necessarily rational, because in essence their decisions are made on rumors and not on 
fundamentals. A further complication arises due to the fact that noise trading is strongly 
correlated and creates what has been coined as herd behavior
3
. Because noise traders’ 
expectations about asset returns are sensitive to fluctuations in the same sentiment they have the 
tendency to overreact or underreact in tandem, their trades are not randomly distributed across 
assets and thus confuse arbitrageurs with their irrational conduct (De Long et al., 1990, 1991).  
           
As opposed to the traditional view that stock return co-movements can result either by changes 
in expected cash flows or the discount rate, the noise trader model postulates that synchronous 
investment activities of unpredictable noise traders would also produce correlated returns. 
Consequently, to the extent that sentiment gives rise to herd behavior of noise traders, this 
sentiment becomes an additional explanatory variable in the return generating process of tradable 
financial assets. In the case of stock prices, the implication of this reasoning is that, besides the 
usual risk factors and macroeconomic variables, the investment activities of both rational 
sophisticated arbitrageurs and irrational naive noise traders will determine market outcome
4
. 
           
                                                          
3 John Maynard Keynes in his masterpiece the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money used the phrase “animal 
spirits” to describe the instincts, propensities and emotions that systematically influence and guide human behavior, and which 
can be manifested in terms of investor sentiment.  
4 The integration of fundamentals and investor sentiment in the valuation process is termed by Charles Lee (2003) fusion 
investing. Robert Shiller (1984) argues that current security market prices transcend their fundamental component by also 
including a term which captures the demand by noise traders, who act solely on sentiment. Thus, fusion investing implies that 
investors besides engaging in fundamental analysis should also consider investor sentiment in terms of fads and fashions. 
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However, with regard to investor sentiment researchers do not agree on a commonly accepted 
definition.  In the relevant literature we find a long list of such definitions, ranging from clouded 
statements about investors’ perceptions to unique psychological biases, which are model 
specific. The picture becomes even more opaque when considering the different ways this term 
has been employed by academic researchers, professional practitioners, and the media (Barberis 
et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 2002; Welch and Qiu, 2004; Cliff and Brown, 2004; Baker and 
Wurgler, 2007; Shefrin, 2008). Specifically, some scholars view investor sentiment as the 
tendency to trade on rumors rather than market information while the investment community 
may use it less formally to indicate periods of euphoria or phobia. 
         
For the purposes of this paper, investor sentiment is defined as the propensity of market 
participants to speculate, and this attitude can be related to the psychological state of mind of 
investors. Thus, it is argued that during market upswings it is euphoria that pushes irrational 
investors to be lax in their investment strategies, whereas during corrections they base their 
investment decisions on a wider spectrum of considerations and more careful analyses (Schwarz, 
2002). In the same spirit, Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) assert that investors become less attentive 
in good times, which leads to mispricing of stocks. In addition, Brown and Cliff (2004) describe 
sentiment as the expectation of market participants relative to a norm, according to which the 
average investor is a zero sentiment person whereas a bullish (bearish) investor expects higher 
(lower) returns than this norm
5
. 
           
                                                          
5
 The former Federal Reserve System chairman Alan Greenspan initiated the term “irrational exuberance” to describe the 
excessive euphoria in the stock market during the 1990s, and explicitly warn investors of the high risks associated with the 
bubble in dotcom stocks. Also, Robert Shiller (2002) blames the presence of sentiment as “irrational exuberance” driving the 
prices of U.S. stocks well above their fundamental values. 
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As emerging markets are dominated relatively more by individual investors and lack availability 
of quality information and professional financial analysts’ services, the performances of these 
markets are more likely to be influenced by the sentiment of general investors. Short selling 
usually is either not allowed or it is very shallow in many emerging stock markets and this is for 
all practical purposes the case of the Greek market as well.
6
 Hence, as expected, the absence of 
the mechanism of short selling makes it difficult for smart investors to respond quickly to any 
new information in order to align mispriced stocks. Despite the high possibility of presence of 
sentiment in the Greek capital market, there are only a couple of published papers dealing with 
the effect of sentiment. Thus, this paper investigates the performance of the Greek stock market 
primarily from behavioral perspective by introducing sentiment factors in the empirical asset 
pricing models. Based on the above discussion, we believe that the impact of sentiment is an 
important research issue for the Greek market and hence the paper contributes to the 
understanding of the operation of this market.  
           
We formalize our investigation on the significance of sentiment in the Greek market by forming 
the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The Greek stock market with its periphery attributes is expected to be relatively 
more prone to investor sentiment influence, in line with other less developed markets. 
Hypothesis 2:  Of the two complete stock market activity cycles that were recorded over the last 
twenty five years, we postulate that the former is characterized by stronger sentiment influence 
                                                          
6 Short-selling was officially introduced in Greece with the establishment of the Derivatives Market, which started operations in 
August 1999. However, short-selling activity was never significant and remained shallow ever since, due to small number of 
stocks available for repos contracts. A short-selling ban on all stocks was reintroduced in August 2011, in order to protect 
investors from the fallout of the country's debt crisis.  
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than the latter.  This belief stems from the observable fact that during the first cycle the number 
of immature and unsophisticated market participants was much larger than in the second cycle.  
In other words, because so many “investors” were forcefully stripped off their wealth when the 
market collapsed in 1999 they wouldn’t dare repeat the same mistake twice. 
 Hypothesis 3:  For both cycles, the upswing phase is expected to exhibit stronger sentiment 
influence than the downswing. 
           
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section II presents an overview of the relevant 
literature on sentiment as determinant of stock returns.  In section III we discuss the main 
characteristics of the Greek stock market, the evolutionary historical developments that have 
shaped it through the past quarter of a century, and its relative performance over the last two 
major activity cycles of “boom and bust”. Section IV describes in detail the sources of data used 
in our analyses and the rational of using the information contained therein. We also discuss the 
research methodology used in the study. In section V we present the analysis of the results of our 
empirical investigation. In section VI we conclude the paper. 
 
II.     Literature Review 
The long debate among finance theorists and researchers on whether sentiment influences stock 
prices is still to a large extent not resolved. Black (1986) introduces the concept of noise trading 
and explains how irrational investors guided by sentiment distort market outcomes. Trueman 
(1988) extents Black’s point further and explains why an investor would rationally opt to trade 
on noise. De Long et al. (1990) develop a model where noise traders acting in concert can 
influence equilibrium stock prices because arbitrageurs are incapable of eliminating such 
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disequilibria, which implies that sentiment is priced.  Schleifer and Summers (1990) challenge 
the efficient market paradigm by showing that the assumption of limited arbitrage in financial 
markets is more plausible than the one of perfect arbitrage.  Shefrin and Statman (1994) extend 
the CAPM by allowing noise trading to interact with rational information trading and show that 
noise traders act as a second driver, which destabilizes financial markets and pushes stock prices 
away from their equilibrium value.  
           
On the other hand, some researchers argue in favor of the EMH, in the sense that investor 
sentiment does not qualify as a risk factor.  Elton et al. (1998) provide evidence against the 
proposition that investor sentiment is priced in the U.S. stock market. Doukas and Milonas 
(2004) conduct an out of sample analysis in the Greek capital market, which they consider more 
likely to be prone to investor sentiment, and do not find supporting evidence for the role of 
sentiment in explaining the returns of closed-end funds. In line with Elton et al. they claim that 
their findings do not support the hypothesis that investor sentiment represents an independent 
and systematic asset pricing risk. Partly in line with these findings, Brown and Cliff (1999) find 
weak relationship between sentiment and stock returns, although they report existence of strong 
relationship between sentiment and returns of small stocks. Likewise, Leonard and Shull (1996) 
investigate the investor sentiment effect on NYSE stocks over the two periods from July 1965 to 
April 1980 and again from that date to December 1994. Their findings suggest a dichotomy over 
the significance of investor sentiment as a risk factor. Whereas investor sentiment is priced in the 
first sub-period, it loses its explanatory power during the second sub-period. 
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Overall, research in developed economies reveals the existence of a significant relationship 
between stock returns and the sentiment of the market (Bhaskaran, 1996; Barberis et al., 1998; 
Brown and Cliff, 2004; Baker and Wurgler, 2006, Kumar and Lee, 2006; and several others). 
Specifically, Bhaskaran (1996) examines the relation between closed-end fund discounts and 
small firm returns and discovers that discounts forecast future small firm returns and also provide 
independent information about the conditional expected returns of small firms. In addition, he 
finds that discounts forecast only the small firm factor return out of the five factors suggested by 
Fama and French (1993). Kumar and Lee (2006) show that the trading activities of retail 
investors are highly correlated and explain return co-movements for stocks with high retail 
concentration that are difficult to arbitrage, which is consistent with the predictions of the noise 
trading model. Beaumont et al. (2008) find that sentiment has a significant and asymmetric effect 
on stock returns volatility. Finter et al. (2010) report that an index of market sentiment explains 
the spread between the returns of sentiment sensitive stocks and sentiment insulated stocks. 
Additionally, they find that stocks that are difficult to arbitrage and evaluate are more sensitive to 
market sentiment. Baker et al. (2011) consider both local and global sentiment factors to 
investigate the presence of sentiment in six major markets. They report that high sentiment 
causes low future returns for relatively difficult to arbitrage and evaluate stocks. Antoniou et al. 
(2012) find that higher momentum of returns occurs in higher sentiment periods and such 
momentum is absent during pessimistic periods. Finally, Baker and Wurgler (2006) point out 
that in case of young firms, extreme growth firms, small firms, and non-dividend-paying firms 
the chance of subjective evaluation increases, which leads to susceptibility to market sentiment. 
Thus, if the market itself is young, there should be even higher probability of the presence of 
sentiment. 
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Research on a number of emerging markets indicates that sentiment plays a role in explaining 
stock returns. To begin with, Aitken (1998) finds that as soon as institutional investors start 
investing in emerging economies’ markets stock returns there experience a sharp increase in 
autocorrelation. He concludes that the presence of institutional investors’ sentiment in emerging 
markets works as a risk factor in the determination of asset prices, resulting in overshooting. 
Kling and Gao (2008) show that sentiment influences stock returns in the Chinese stock market. 
More precisely, they find that although the mood of investors follows a positive feedback in the 
short-run, stock price and investor sentiment do not have a long-run relationship. Institutional 
investors are optimistic (pessimistic) when previous market returns are positive (negative).  Also, 
institutional investors’ sentiment is not found to predict future stock returns. Canbas and Kandir 
(2009) investigate the relation between investor sentiment and sock returns on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange, and their results indicate that past stock portfolio returns influence investor sentiment, 
while investor sentiment fails to forecast future stock returns. 
           
Zouaoui et al. (2010) use panel data of 15 European and U.S. stock markets and find that 
sentiment has more effect on stock returns in those countries where investors are prone to herd 
behavior and institutional investment is relatively low. Grigaliuniene and Cibulskiene (2010) 
examine the effect of sentiment in Scandinavian markets and report negative relationship 
between sentiment and future stock returns. Liu et al. (2011) consider the direct and indirect 
effects of sentiment factors on Taiwan stock market returns. Their results indicate that extreme 
sentiment indicator plays a critical role in determining changes in market returns. Anusakumar et 
al. (2012) report that local as well as global sentiment influence stock returns of a sample of 13 
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Asian stock markets. Their findings indicate the presence of sentiment in these markets and their 
result is robust with respect to firm size, trading volume, sample period and other proxies. 
Zhuang and Song (2012) examine the relationship between investor sentiment and stock returns 
and volatility in the Chinese stock market. They report that investor sentiment has a strong 
impact on stock returns in the Chinese stock market. Liston et al. (2012) investigate Dow Jones 
Islamic Equity indices to find that bullish shifts in sentiment in current period lower conditional 
future volatility. Rehman (2013) gives empirical evidence that stock returns of Karachi Stock 
Exchange, a market which primarily consists of retail investors, are also influenced by investor 
sentiments. Chowdhury et al. (2014) examine the effect of sentiment on returns in the 
Bangladesh stock market and find that high sentiment leads to high contemporaneous returns 
followed by downward correction in the next month and this is mainly observed for small size 
portfolios. Thus, they conclude that sentiment should be considered as a source of systematic 
risk. 
            
Research on the Greek market reveals that it is rather susceptible to investor sentiment, which is 
not surprising given that this market does not exactly possess the attributes of a mature capital 
market. Having said that, it is expected that stock prices in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) 
would not follow a random walk and this implies that the market is not informationally efficient. 
Dockery and Kavussanos (1995) performed unit root tests over the period 1998 to 1994 using 
panel data for a sample of 73 companies listed on the ASE and conclude that the Greek stock 
market is inefficient and, therefore, share prices tend to move systematically over time.  Niarchos 
and Alexakis (1998) investigate the speed of price adjustment between common and preferred 
shares and find that the Greek market exhibits characteristics of inefficiency, because the price 
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movements of preferred shares tend to follow the price change of common shares. Thus, contrary 
to the prediction of the EMH, it is possible to forecast the price movement of preferred shares 
based on the information conveyed by price changes of common shares. Patra and Poshakwale 
(2006) examine the link between selected macroeconomic variables and stock returns in the 
Greek market during the 1990s and find a persistent relationship between inflation, money 
supply, trading volume and stock prices. They conclude that the Greek stock market is not 
efficient because publically available information regarding macroeconomic variables and 
trading volumes can be potentially used to predict future stock prices. Athanasiadis (2010) tests 
the weak-form of  EMH  in the Greek market by using daily closing prices over the period 2000 
to 2008 of stocks of two major stock indices, the GI (general index) and the FTSE-20 (large cap).  
He reports that whereas shares of the GI do not follow a random walk process, which implies 
rejection of the efficient market hypothesis in its weak form, in the case of FTSE-20 shares the 
test is inconclusive. In the latter case half of the socks appear to follow a random walk pattern 
but the other half does not do that. Alexakis (2011) investigates the stock price movement 
between large and small banks in the Athens Stock Exchange, before and during the financial 
crisis of 2008-2009 and finds that they exhibit totally different price behavior. That is, big banks 
during the financial crisis showed stock price dynamics due to high institutional ownership, 
which were affected by correlated negative sentiment or mimicking minimizing loss strategies 
irrespective of the quality of the banks’ assets.  On the antipode of these findings, Doukas and 
Milonas (2004) do not find support for the hypothesis that investor sentiment represents an 
independent and systematic asset pricing risk in the Greek capital market. 
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III.     The Greek Stock Market in Historical Perspective 
 
The Greek economy entered the 1990s burdened with serious macroeconomic imbalances and 
significant structural rigidities, mainly as a result of the economic policies implemented during 
the previous decades. The 1980s was marked by considerable slowdown in economic activity as 
indicated by the modest growth in GDP, which averaged just 1.5% annually for the entire period. 
This development is in sharp contrast with the preceding two decades, during which the average 
GDP growth was 7% and 5% in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively.  Inflation on the contrary rose 
continuously and by the end of 1989 it reached approximately twenty percent and this had an 
immediate impact on nominal interest rates, which hovered around 25 percent.  Most economic 
indicators demonstrated a significant deterioration of the economic situation in Greece. The large 
government sector and its huge pervasiveness in all aspects of economic activity were 
accountable for this gloomy situation.  Public sector enterprises losses, which in the early 90s 
produced over 60% of output in the industrial and services sector (including financial services), 
and excessive government consumption expenditures translated into persistently high deficits in 
the national budget, which eventually led to an unsustainable public debt.  
           
The sample period extends from January 1995 until April 2014, covering a period of almost two 
decades.  We selected the mid-nineties as the starting point because it marks the beginning of a 
long bullish market, which is mainly attributed to a number of major transformations of the 
Greek economy.  These structural changes were the outcome of a strict convergence plan aiming 
at fulfilling the Maastricht criteria for joining the European Monetary Union and adopting the 
Euro as the twelfth member state.  Being part of the Eurozone provided the country with a stable 
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macroeconomic environment unprecedented hitherto and this laid down the foundations for long-
term economic growth.  
           
On the institutional front, during the 1990s the Athens Stock Exchange witnessed a long wave of 
modernization characterized by structural changes, innovation, and expansion.  These qualitative 
changes infused confidence in the investor community that the local stock market was finally 
transforming from an emerging market into a serious and trusted venue to place one’s savings, 
equivalent to advanced economies.  As a result we observe a sharp increase in the number of 
financially healthy full-service brokerage firms.  Additionally, the Parallel Market was 
established in 1990, thus providing an alternative permanent source of funds for small and 
medium firms.  Also, the Automated Electronic Trading System was adopted, which expedited 
the trading orders execution thus ending the 116 years-old tradition of trading with the outmoded 
outcry method. 
           
The stock market after a prolong period of hibernation, having overcome a number of 
institutional and functional inertia foresaw both successfully and timely the ensuing benefits 
stemming from the positive changes taking place in the economy.  Consequently, over the 
second half of the 1990s the Athens Stock Exchange experienced the greatest upswing phase of 
its growth ever, not so much with regard to the increase in the level of its index but in some other 
qualitative developments, such as: 
 By the end of 1999 the number of active accounts of private investors reached 1.5 
million, which is the largest number in history. 
 The volume of average daily turnover exceeded €650 million. 
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 Market capitalization increased to record high of 150 percent of annual GDP. 
 The number of foreign institutional investors not only increased manifold but at the same 
time they became the most active market participants. 
 During the year 1999 alone the amount of funds raised by firms in the primary market 
reached almost €13 billion.  And over the period of 1997 to 2000 approximately €32 
billion were raised in the capital market. 
 
Furthermore, right from the start of the year 1997 trading volume gained significant momentum 
and as a result sock prices began trending upwards.  Both the Government and the positive 
international economic climate of that time contributed towards this dynamism.  The 
Government’s contribution resulted from its realization that capital markets could function as a 
conduit in the privatization process, and the latter’s contribution because by 1997 world stock 
market activity was already experiencing one of the strongest and prolonged bull euphoria.  It 
was this time that the former FED chairman Alan Greenspan coined as the period of “irrational 
exuberance”. The Greek stock exchange had experienced similar bull market periods in the past, 
especially in 1972 and 1990, but this time there was a material qualitative difference.  Now stock 
investing became a cliché for everyone and all of a sudden it topped everything else in the 
evening news.  This time the stock euphoria like a giant vacuum absorbed hundreds of thousands 
of ordinary households, with no prior investing experience whatsoever, throughout the entire 
country from large metropolitan cities to the most remote mountain village.   
           
As a result of this outright irrational exuberance the General Index climaxed on 17 September, 
1999 when it reached the all-time high of 6,355 points.  During this period the number of listed 
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companies in the ASE increased to 279 and the stock market capitalization by the end of 1999 
reached almost €200 billion, in comparison to just a little over €7 billion in the beginning of the 
decade.  At the same time, trading volume also increased many-fold rising to approximately 
€175 billion in 1999 compared to a meager €5 billion in 1990.  Eventually, the market ran out of 
fuel, the pressure on stock prices subsided and by the year 2000 the situation was completely out 
of control, mainly because  the  majority of emerging and a few of the advanced matured markets 
were moving deeper into the correction phase of the investing cycle.  However, this time the bear 
market was short-lived and soon stock activity revived due to the fact that all of the required 
institutional and regulatory changes had been completed, and the electronic order execution 
systems were upgraded.  All these positive developments coupled with Greece’s post-joining the 
Eurozone monetary stability contributed to upgrading the Greek stock market to the category of 
advanced matured markets in May 2001. 
           
The Greek stock market hit its bottom around March 2003 to rebound again very aggressively 
and keep on rising until the eruption of the great financial crisis of 2008, which followed the 
collapse of world markets that were initiated with the annihilation of Lehman Brothers in the 
USA.  The rest is history; the Greek state became insolvent being unable to roll over its 
borrowing at maturity, the yield on government bonds went through the roof, the rating agencies 
downgraded the country to “junk” status and the so called troika (IMF, ECB and EU) came to 
“rescue” by providing the largest loan in human history to a sovereign state, however to no avail. 
The rescue efforts failed because the bailout terms stated in the memorandum were so 
horrendous and aligned with unheard of austerity measures that forced the Greek economy to the 
worst depression ever recorded in modern economic history.  Thus, after six whole years of 
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continued austerity and structural reforms the economy is still suffering from deficiency of 
effective demand, due to the fact that the GDP has shrunk by one third over this time period.  
Consequently, as long as the Greek economy struggles to come to grips with a public debt to 
GDP ratio exceeding 170 percent and worsening through time, there is no chance that its stock 
market will revive and the likelihood that the Composite Index of the Athens Stock Exchange 
will hover around 1,000 points is more than certain. In light of the developments discussed 
previously, it is not surprising that stock prices in the Athens Stock Exchange are characterized 
by sharp volatility, as it is generally true for all stock markets worldwide, but in the case of the 
Greek market the variability is much more intense and every time the bubble bursts has resulted 
in complete wiping out entire households’ fortunes. 
           
As indicated in Figure 1, from 1990 until the beginning of 1997 activity in the Greek stock 
market was rather anemic, during which period the General Index of ASE was struggling to 
penetrate sustainably the 1,000 points resistance ceiling.  However, since that year the stock 
market started attracting investors’ interest and the representative index really exploded as a 
result, culminating in mid-September of 1999 when the general index reached the all record 
height of 6,335 points.  That is, in less than two years market activity increased by more than 500 
percent.  It was precisely during this euphoria period that everyone in Greece got involved in one 
way or another with stock investing, they started neglecting most other productive activities and 
sold real estate properties, farm-lands and equipment and other real assets in order to get 
liquidity to burn out in the stock market inferno. 
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The insanity of the average Greek citizen obsessed with stock investments is illustrated vividly in 
Figure 2, in which we present the market-capitalization-to-GDP ratio.  The main observation in 
that graph is that whereas in the early nineties the market capitalization was always below 20 
percent of GDP (in current prices) all of a sudden at the height of the big bubble of 1999 it 
climbed to almost 1.5 times the GDP of that year.  Following the collapse of the market this ratio 
retreated to about 50 percent and after that it climbed to a little over 80 percent just before the 
start of the great recession of 2008, to shrink permanently to less than 20 percent during the last 
few years. 
     
When the bubble busted with ear-drum destroying sound the most violent wealth redistribution 
in Greek economic history took place from the unprotected innocent and ignorant “investors” to 
the so called smart money makers.  Foreign hedge funds abandoned the cash producing cow 
having left just a skeleton from what previously used to be a tireless money making machine. 
Thus, it took a little over three years for the market to lose almost everything it had gained, and 
by the beginning of 2003 it retreated to about the same level as in the early nineties, which is a 
little less than the 1,500 points psychological threshold. 
           
History has a tendency to repeat itself and the stock market is no exception to this rule.  The 
difference is that this time the big noise-making crowd was completely absent and only the more 
sophisticate informed rational participants started considering stock investing as an attractive 
alternative to place their excess liquidity.  This is why it took the market now four and a half 
years to reach its new peak at 5,335 points in October 2007 from the previous trough of March 
2003, and that was exactly 1,000 points short of the all-time highest level.  As was mentioned 
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previously, world developments at the end of 2007 were so dramatically pronounced that led the 
global economy into the most severe recession since the times of the Great Depression of the 
1930s, but Greece in particular was hit in the hardest way in comparison to the other peripheral 
economies within the Eurozone.  As a result, the Greek stock market today after almost seven 
years of correction still is unable of finding its way out, being stuck with the representative index 
at the 1,000 points level. 
           
The narrative of the Greek stock market evolution over the past quarter of a century vividly 
suggests that this venue provides an excellent laboratory for testing the small investors’ 
sentiment hypothesis proposed by behavioral finance scholars.  This belief stems from the fact 
that the market environment in Greece is more likely to be prone to investor sentiment reaction 
in relation to other mature capital markets.  Our approach is in line with the one adopted by 
Doukas and Mylonas in their study, in which they cite the following reasons for conducting an 
out-of-sample test of the sentiment hypothesis in the Greek stock market.  Firstly, the Greek 
capital market experienced two whole investment cycles during our examination period.  The 
unprecedented boom and bust, especially during the first cycle, leads us to expect that investor 
sentiment should be more pronounced in this kind of stock market environment.  Secondly, the 
Greek capital market falls by far behind the mature and sophisticated markets of the USA and 
most developed West European capital markets. Therefore, we hypothesize that human emotions 
should have a greater impact on investment decisions, which implies that “noise” traders play a 
crucial role in determining stock prices in this type of financial setting.  Thirdly, to the extent 
that investing by word of mouth and rumors rather than relying on fundamentals is primarily a 
characteristic trait of small investors we expect sentiment to be more pronounced in the Greek 
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market, in which inexperienced and amateur participants account for a large fraction of total 
market activity. 
 
IV.     Data and Methodology 
A.   Data 
For the computational needs of our analyses we focus on market aggregates rather than on 
individual stock data. Although it is highly probable that sentiment will permeate across all 
stocks to the market level, we cannot rule out the possibility that the number of stocks positively 
affected by bullish sentiment is roughly the same as those that are negatively affected by bearish 
sentiment and thus they negate one another. In any case, our reliance on market aggregates is 
primarily imposed by pragmatic considerations stemming from the fact that most of the measures 
we examine are available for the entire market and not on a disaggregated level. Our empirical 
investigation is conducted using monthly data and most of our indexes span over the time period 
from January 1995 through April 2014, resulting in a total of 232 observations. However, 
because some variables are not available for the full period part of the analyses is performed on 
shorter subintervals, as indicated in the respective tables. Descriptive statistics for the variables 
used in the study are presented in Table I. Additionally, in Table II we show contemporaneous 
pairwise correlations for these variables. Discussion of these variables and their sources is 
presented in the next section.  
a. Direct Sentiment Measures 
To carry out our empirical investigation we require various measures of investor sentiment. 
Fortunately, in our case, the Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs of the 
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European Commission conducts regularly harmonized surveys for different sectors of the 
economies in the European Union (EU) member states. These surveys are addressed to 
representatives of the industry (manufacturing), the services, retail trade, and construction 
sectors, as well as to consumers and they are published in their present format on a monthly basis 
since 1985. With these data composite indicators are constructed to track cyclical movements in 
a specific sector and in the economy as a whole.  
            
We use two of these economic indicators as proxies to gauge investor sentiment for the entire 
period of the analyses. The first is the Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), which is constructed 
as a composite index from the surveys on the five above mentioned sectors.
7
 We believe that this 
overall sentiment measure is more appropriate to use as a proxy for capturing the investment 
sentiment of the Greek market.  Additionally, we experiment with a narrower version of market 
sentiment, i.e., Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI), in order to test whether the model would 
identify it as a separate risk factor. It is noted that the CCI is included in the construction of the 
ESI with twenty percent weight and, therefore, these two measures are highly correlated, as 
indicated in Table 2.A couple of comments on the qualitative characteristics of these sentiment 
measures are warranted. Firstly, the ESI shows considerably less variability than the CCI. The 
coefficient of variation of the former is only one fourth of the latter. Secondly, the range of the 
ESI is much narrower than the CCI’s. Thirdly, consumer’s confidence in Greece is generally 
always disappointingly low in comparison to the confidence for the economy as a whole. This 
issue becomes even more pronounced when the comparison is made with regards to the entire 
European Union. Specifically, the CCI in the EU for the period under investigation averaged -
                                                          
7 The sectoral weights used to construct theses composite indicators are as follows: industry 40%, services 30%, consumer 20%, 
construction 5%, and retail trade 5%. 
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12.2 and ranged between 1.6 and -32.2, whereas in Greece the average was -40.3 and the range 
was between -5.8 and -83.8. Lastly, the respective figures for the ESI show an average of 100.0 
with range between 67.2 and 116.8 for the EU, whereas in Greece the average was 99.2 and the 
index ranged from 74.4 to 118.7.
8
 
b. Indirect Sentiment Measures 
In our models we use the Mutual Fund Discount (MFDIS) as the indirect measure of investor 
sentiment. Although in the relevant literature findings on the appropriateness of this measure as 
an indicator of individual sentiment are not conclusive (see, for example, Lee et all. (1991)), we 
nevertheless decided to employ it mainly because it is the only one that we could reliably access.   
           
The overwhelming majority of the Greek closed-end funds have traditionally been subsidiaries of 
domestic banks, which hold a majority of share capital and also appoint their management teams. 
These funds are required by Greek law to publish their net asset value at the end of each month. 
The monthly data on closed-end funds used in our investigation were provided by the 
Association of Greek Institutional Investors.  Table 1 shows that the deviations of prices from 
their NAVs are quite substantial, ranging from a maximum premium of 71 percent to a 
maximum discount of 45 percent. However, over the entire period under investigation on the 
average these funds experienced a rather large discount of 16.5 percent and quite high standard 
deviation of about 20 percent. 
           
Following Lee et all. (1991) and Doukas and Milonas (2004), we constructed a value-weighted 
index of discount (VWD) for each month as follows: 
 
                                                          
8 These comments are drawn from the raw data, which are available upon request. 
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c. Economy and Market Variables 
In addition to sentiment measures we collected data on some key macroeconomic and stock 
market variables. Among the variables employed in the former category we use the Index on 
Industrial Production (IPI) as an indicator of economic activity, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
as a measure of inflation, and the yield on ten-year government bonds as a proxy for the risk-free 
nominal interest rate. Data concerning the IPI and the CPI were collected from publications of 
the Hellenic Statistical Authority (EL.STAT.), whereas information on sovereign debt rates was 
gathered from publications of the Bank of Greece. 
           
Market returns are calculated based on the major indexes used to gauge stock market activity by 
the Athens Stock Exchange. Firstly, the ATHEX Composite Share Price Index (Composite) 
includes the shares of the 60 largest listed companies in terms of market capitalization. Secondly, 
the FTSE/ATHEX 20, which was introduced in September 1997, includes the 20 largest blue 
chip companies in the market. Lastly, the FTSE/ATHEX Mid-cap Index (introduced in 
December 1999), and the FTSE/ATHEX Small-cap Index (introduced in May 2001) gauge 
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trading activity in the medium and small segments category, respectively. It is noted that all 
these market indices are value weighted. 
 
B.   Methodology 
There are two types of sentiment measures; direct and indirect. Investor surveys provide the 
direct measure of sentiment of the market. On the other hand, several indirect sentiment proxies 
have been used in the extant literature.  
Fortunately, for the Greek market confidence index and sentiment index are available. We use 
these two sentiment measures along with mutual fund discount rates to investigate the effect of 
sentiment on stocks listed in Athens Stock Exchange. Usually, sentiment proxies are highly 
correlated. Consequently, researchers employ tools such as Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
in order to construct a single sentiment measure from various sentiment factors. We also find 
high correlation among the three sentiment proxies used in the study. Table 2 indicates that the 
economic sentiment (ESI) and the consumer confidence (CCI) indexes have correlation of 0.88, 
which is very high, implying that we have to construct a unified sentiment index. Even the 
mutual fund discount rate (MFDIS) has correlation of 0.44 with the ESI.   
           
Because the correlation between the ESI and the CCI is extremely high we cannot use both of 
them in the same regression model. Thus, we also employ (PCA) to make a Unified Sentiment 
Indicator (USI) proxy that can be safely used instead of the above-mentioned three sentiment 
variables. The PCA shows that the first principal component can account for 49% of the 
variation in these three sentiment variables. Moreover, only the first component has an 
eigenvalue greater than one. Therefore, we can pick only the first component as a proxy for our 
sentiment. Finally, the statistical package E-Views generates a data series that can be used as a 
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sentiment proxy, which also has a unit variance. Monthly macroeconomic data, such as interest 
rates, industrial production growth, and inflation are also used to isolate the effect of market risk. 
We run the following regression model:      
                                                                                                        
where: INF, INT and IP indicate monthly inflation, interest rates and industrial production 
growth, respectively.  
We use several forms of returns. Rt could be Athens Composite Index, FTSE-20, FTSE-Mid-cap 
or FTSE-Small-cap. 
V.     Analysis of Results   
Table III presents the regression results for the whole period. There are four dependent variables: 
excess returns from all share index, excess returns from FTSE-20, excess returns from FTSE 
Mid-cap and excess returns from FTSE Small-cap index. The estimated coefficients of the three 
sentiment indicators – Mutual Fund Discount (MFD), Economic Sentiment Indicator (ESI), and 
Consumer Confidence Indicator (CCI) – are reported in this table. Coefficients of the two 
macroeconomic risk factors – Inflation and Industrial Growth – are not shown, because they are 
used as control variables. Three different combinations of sentiment proxies for every dependent 
variable have been employed. The fourth combination (where all sentiment indicators could be 
used) would result in possible occurrence of near multicolinearity, and thus this model is 
excluded from consideration. 
           
For the Composite Index (that is, excess return on Composite Index), the MFD rate and the ESI 
significantly affect returns. However, the R
2
s of
 
the
 
regressions are very close to zero, signifying 
that a very large portion of returns is not explained by these sentiment proxies. The fourth 
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regression model uses a Unified Sentiment Index (USI), which is constructed from all three 
sentiment proxies. This USI is found to be significantly related to market returns. Next, similar 
regressions are also run for Large-cap, Mid-cap and Small-cap firm returns. 
             
In the case of Large-caps, the coefficients for MFD rates and ESI are significant at the 5% level. 
As the coefficient for CCI is significant at 10% level, we can say that it has comparatively weak 
influence on the returns of large firms. On the other hand, the relationship between large firm 
returns and the USI is found to be significant at the5%level. 
                
For Medium and Small firms, both ESI and CCI indexes exert significant influence. For all the 
regressions discussed above, the MFD and the ESI have positive coefficients, whereas the CCI 
has negative coefficients. It is noted that this happens because of the manner these indices are 
constructed. Higher values of MFD and ESI indicate more favorable market sentiment and 
enthusiasm, which drives prices up and ultimately resulting in higher returns. The CCI series, on 
the other hand, is always negative and its movement toward zero is considered to be a positive 
shift in sentiment. Because the raw data have been converted into percentage changes, a positive 
shift in sentiment corresponds to a smaller change in percentage terms. Thus, our results show a 
negative relationship between the CSI and stock returns. 
           
The overall conclusion we draw from Table III is that the USI appears to be the most important 
factor across all types of sentiment indices considered in the study.  The estimated coefficients of 
this comprehensive sentiment proxy are not only larger than the coefficients of the rest sentiment 
indicators but they also have the highest t values.  This finding is especially true for the Mid-caps 
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and Small-caps cases where the coefficients besides being the largest, they are also characterized 
by greater explanatory power according to the respective R
2
 values. 
            
Because over the entire period of investigation the effect of sentiment on excess returns, albeit 
weak, is found significant we examine two sub-periods (1/1997 – 12/2002 and 1/2003 - 4/2012), 
in order to test its consistency on stock prices. We consider these two periods in line with the 
historical movements of stock prices. As seen in Figure 1, during the first period, the General 
Index ascended very rapidly and afterwards it monotonously slumped at an even faster rate. The 
same cyclical pattern characterizes the second period, the major difference this time being that 
both the upward and downward phases are relatively more prolonged and do not show that much 
variability. Our aim is to investigate the existence of a shift in the attitude of stock market 
behavior in these two sub-periods, as far as the relationship between sentiment and stock return 
is concerned.  
           
In Table IV we present the results for the first complete market cycle, from 1/1997 through 
12/2002. We examine the effect of sentiment on excess returns for the Composite and the Large-
cap cases only because the available observations for the other two market indices (Mid-cap and 
Small-cap) are not sufficient to warrant reliable conclusions. The general finding conveyed by 
this table is that, contrary to our expectations, sentiment does not play any role over this period. 
The coefficients of all sentiment indicators are very low and insignificant, with the exception 
perhaps of the MFD. Moreover, the R
2
s are very close to zero indicating that variations in excess 
returns are not explained by investors’ mood. This paradox could be attributed to the extreme 
severity of both the upswing and downswing phases of this market cycle during which euphoria 
and phobia apparently wash out one another, thus negating the sentiment effect. Or, perhaps, the 
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number of stocks positively affected by bullish sentiment is roughly the same as those that are 
negatively affected by bearish sentiment and thus they cancel each other. 
           
Table V shows the results for the second market cycle, from 1/2003 through 6/2012. The 
availability of data over this period allows us to examine sentiment’s influence on excess returns 
for all the market indices. As opposed to the first cycle, sentiment over this period exerts a strong 
influence on market excess returns. The coefficients of every sentiment proxy are high and 
significant for each of the market indicators, with the exception of the Composite Index. This is 
especially true with regard to the Unified Sentiment Indicator, for which coefficients are the 
highest and by far the most statistically significant. Moreover, the R
2
 values have improved 
considerably in relation to the previous period.  
Next we embark on investigating the effect of sentiment over the upswing and downswing 
phases of the two distinct market cycles. The regression results of market excess returns on USI 
are reported in Table VIII. With regard to the second market cycle the required data are available 
and therefore it becomes feasible to carry out full investigation. These results are analytically 
shown in Table VI and Table VII, respectively, for the “boom” and “bust” of the latter market 
cycle. However, detailed investigation of the individual sentiment proxies and their effect could 
not be made for the up and down phases of the first market cycle (period 01/1997 – 12/2000 and 
again period 01/2001 – 03/2003) due to lack of sufficient data.  
Table VI presents the results for the sub-period from 1/2003 through 6/2007. The most striking 
observation here is that many of the coefficients of intercept terms are significant. This indicates 
that the return of Composite Index and large firms are explained to a great extent by itself or 
some other undisclosed factors. Once again, among all sentiment indicators the Unified 
29 
 
Sentiment Index is the most influential factor. Returns for both large firms and medium firms are 
significantly influenced by sentiment. Because the intercept terms for large firms are significant, 
apparently returns of these firms increased during this period on their own without any particular 
relationship to sentiment. Interestingly, small firms show no sensitivity at all to sentiment factors 
during this period.  
Table VII presents the regression results for the period from July 2007 through April 2014. The 
findings here are somewhat different from those reported in Table VI. The most striking 
difference between 1/2003-6/2007 and 7/2007-4/2014 is the change of sign for the intercept 
terms. Intercepts indicate that index returns are not explained by sentiment factors. However, the 
intercept sign has always been positive in the former period whereas it turns negative in the latter 
period. This phenomenon can be explained by the fact that during the first (second) period stock 
prices almost always rose (dropped). Sentiment factors only weakly explain excess returns. 
Among these factors the Unified Sentiment Index, as previously, has the ability to explain 
returns. In this period, sentiment factors, albeit weakly, can explain the return of small firms. 
Overall, except for the signs of intercept terms, because the impact of sentiment on returns 
during 1/2003-6/2007 and 7/2007-4/2014 is similar, we can also conclude that market reaction to 
sentiment remains almost unchanged regardless of the state of the investment cycle. 
             
Table VIII shows how sentiment could possibly be related to market returns (Composite Index 
Returns) in two long-run-up-and-down-market periods. The second column exhibits whether a 
particular time period corresponds to an upward or a downward market trend. Because, as 
already has been shown, the overall sentiment measure performs the best among all proxies we 
only consider the unified sentiment variable for this investigation (USI). Our results indicate that 
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sentiment exerts significant impact on stock returns only in the second long-run up market 
(04/2003 – 12/2007). Therefore, the relation between returns and sentiment in long-run trend (up 
or down) is weak. 
VI.     Conclusion 
This paper investigates the influence of market sentiment on the Greek stock market returns. The 
results suggest that for the entire period under investigation market sentiment exerts a significant 
albeit week effect on stock returns. Among the various size portfolios the effect of sentiment is 
more pronounced in the case of mid-caps. For all the different periods that we examine their 
regression coefficients have the greatest values.  Furthermore, the results do not indicate any 
material difference when the whole period is divided into two sub-periods as suggested by the 
long-term trend of the market. On the contrary, examination of sentiment’s influence during the 
upswings and downswings of the two market cycles conveys that its effect is most pronounced 
during the period that preceded the market meltdown in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 
2007. As a consequence, the Greek stock market completely collapsed and even today, more 
than six years later, it still struggles to find its way to recovery. This development is not 
surprising at all, given that the Greek Economy was hit the hardest of all the peripheral Eurozone 
countries because of its extreme sovereign debt burden. Finally, our results point to the direction 
that a unified sentiment variable probably captures this stock market’s sentiment better than any 
other sentiment proxy considered in isolation.  
 
As a peripheral market, the Greek stock market would be expected to exhibit vulnerability to 
investor sentiment. However, our results fail to strongly support this suspicion, which is not 
surprising since Doukas and Milonas (2004) also do not find support for the hypothesis that 
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investor sentiment represents a systematic asset pricing risk in the Greek capital market. 
Therefore, in the absence of strong sentiment influence, future studies may look into other 
behavior-related trading strategies such as momentum and contrarian to investigate how investor 
behavior may affect this market. 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics 
  Mean Std. Dev. CV Maximum Minimum Skewness Kurtosis N 
RCI 0.1848 9.3013 50.3294 34.5946 -32.6730 -0.2326 1.5218 232 
RF20 -0.4841 10.776 -22.2605 40.9006 -34.9378 -0.1476 1.6048 200 
RFMID -1.2190 10.4712 -8.5810 27.5898 -33.6893 -0.3048 0.7786 176 
RFSMALL -1.3431 11.4337 -8.5130 47.7926 -35.5302 0.2156 3.2996 132 
ESI 99.2138 10.9292 0.1102 118.7000 74.4000 0.7067 0.5914 232 
CCI -40.2582 17.9445 -0.4457 -5.8000 -83.8000 0.8597 0.0317 232 
MFDIS -16.4520 20.0479 -1.2186 71.0377 -45.3442 1.6506 4.4126 208 
 
 
Table II 
 Contemporaneous Correlations 
 CI FTSE20 FTSE-Mid FTSE-Small ESI CCI MFDIS 
CI 1.00       
FTSE20 0.96 1.00      
FTSE-Mid 0.84 0.80 1.00     
FTSE-Small 0.58 0.55 0.66 1.00    
ESI 0.07 0.08 -0.05 0.06 1.00   
CCI 0.06 0.07 -0.02 0.06 0.88 1.00  
MFDIS 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.17 0.44 0.36 1.00 
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Table III 
 Regression Results (Whole Period) 
 
 Intercept MFD ESI CCI USI R2 Obs. 
 
Composite 0.79 
(0.73) 
0.08 
(2.00)** 
- - - 0.02 204 
 
Composite -0.49 
(-0.59) 
- 0.90 
(2.20) ** 
- - 0.03 204 
 
Composite -0.47 
(-0.55) 
- - -0.05 
(-0.92) 
- 0.00 204 
 
Composite -0.55 
(-0.66) 
- - - 1.60 
(2.32)** 
0.03 204 
FTSE-20 0.37 
(0.36) 
0.08 
(2.08) ** 
- - - 0.03 194 
 
FTSE-20 -0.88 
(-1.11) 
- 0.93 
(2.39) ** 
- - 0.04 194 
 
FTSE-20 -0.79 
(-0.99) 
- - -0.10 
(-1.76)* 
- 0.03 194 
 
FTSE-20 -0.93 
(-1.19) 
- - - 1.90 
(2.94)** 
0.06 194 
FTSE-Mid 4.24 
(0.81) 
0.17 
(0.92) 
- - - 0.13 155 
 
FTSE-Mid 0.84 
(0.26) 
- 3.58 
(2.30) ** 
- - 0.15 155 
 
FTSE-Mid 1.20 
(0.36) 
- - -0.55 
(-1.93)** 
- 0.14 155 
 
FTSE-Mid 1.27 
(0.39) 
- - - 7.49 
(2.60)** 
0.16 155 
FTSE-Small 0.45 
(0.30) 
1.00 
(1.81)* 
- - - 0.07 130 
 
FTSE-Small -1.39 
(-1.36) 
- 1.05 
(2.17) ** 
- - 0.08 130 
 
FTSE-Small -1.30 
(-1.26) 
- - -0.17 
(-2.00)** 
- 0.08 130 
 
FTSE-Small -1.32 
(-1.32) 
- - - 2.42 
(2.80)** 
0.11 130 
                
               Note: ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table IV 
 Regression Results (Sub-Period 01/1997-12/2002) 
 
Depend. Var. Intercept MFD ESI CCI USI R2 Obs. 
 
Composite 0.68 
(0.50) 
0.10 
(1.51) 
- - - 0.04 72 
Composite 0.12 
(0.09) 
- 0.60 
(0.94) 
- - 0.02 72 
Composite 0.13 
(0.10) 
- - -0.02 
(-0.34) 
- 0.00 72 
Composite -0.07 
(-0.05) 
- - - 0.95 
(1.02) 
0.02 72 
FTSE-20 -0.49 
(-0.32) 
0.12 
(1.65) 
- - - 0.05 63 
FTSE-20 -1.05 
(-0.70) 
- 0.71 
(0.63) 
- - 0.02 63 
FTSE-20 -1.07 
(-0.70) 
- - -0.02 
(-0.21) 
- 0.01 63 
FTSE-20 -1.24 
(-0.81) 
- - - 0.83 
(0.81) 
0.02 63 
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Table V 
 Regression Results (Sub-Period 01/2003 – 06/2012) 
 
 Intercept MFD ESI CCI USI R2 Obs. 
 
Composite 0.39 
(0.27) 
0.09 
(1.44) 
- - - 0.03 114 
Composite -1.20 
(-0.98) 
- 0.97 
(1.62) 
- - 0.03 114 
Composite -1.24 
(-1.00) 
- - -0.09 
(-0.09) 
- 0.01 114 
Composite -1.17 
(-0.95) 
- - - 1.97 
(1.85)* 
0.03 114 
FTSE-20 0.48 
(0.34) 
0.10 
(1.97)** 
- - - 0.04 114 
FTSE-20 -1.26 
(-1.26) 
- 1.40 
(2.87)** 
- - 0.08 114 
FTSE-20 -1.19 
(-1.18) 
- - -0.23 
(-
2.75)** 
- 0.08 114 
FTSE-20 -1.18 
(-1.20) 
- - - 3.17 
(3.72) ** 
0.12 114 
FTSE-Mid 4.21 
(1.25) 
0.16 
(1.30) 
- - - 0.03 114 
FTSE-Mid 1.65 
(0.71) 
- 2.87 
(2.52) ** 
- - 0.07 114 
FTSE-Mid 1.77 
(0.76) 
- - -0.47 
(-2.40) 
** 
- 0.06 114 
FTSE-Mid 1.77 
(0.77) 
- - - 6.23 
(3.10) ** 
0.09 114 
FTSE-Small 0.52 
(0.34) 
0.08 
(1.51) 
- - - 0.04 114 
FTSE-Small -0.90 
(0.83) 
- 1.25 
(2.37)** 
- - 0.07 114 
FTSE-Small -0.86 
(-0.78) 
- - -0.15 
(-1.69)* 
- 0.05 114 
FTSE-Small -0.85 
(-0.78) 
- - - 2.52 
(2.70)** 
0.08 114 
          
                   Note: ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table VI 
 Regression Results (Sub-Period 01/2003 – 06/2007) 
 
Depend. Var. Intercept MFD ESI CCI USI R2 Obs. 
 
Composite 2.73 
(1.82)* 
0.04 
(0.36) 
- - - 0.15 53 
Composite 2.33 
(3.14)** 
- 0.93 
(2.12)** 
- - 0.22 53 
Composite 2.29 
(3.01) ** 
- - -0.02 
(-0.15) 
- 0.18 53 
Composite 1.86 
(2.60) ** 
- - - 1.95 
(2.34) ** 
0.22 53 
FTSE-20 2.99 
(1.85) * 
0.04 
(0.37) 
- - - 0.16 53 
FTSE-20 2.54 
(3.15) ** 
- 0.83 
(1.73) 
- - 0.21 53 
FTSE-20 2.49 
(3.04) ** 
- - -0.08 
(-1.09) 
- 0.18 53 
FTSE-20 2.10 
(2.65) ** 
- - - 1.80 
(1.99) ** 
0.20 53 
FTSE-Mid 11.45 
(1.20) 
0.23 
(0.34) 
- - - 0.05 53 
FTSE-Mid 8.12 
(1.75)* 
- 6.17 
(2.16) ** 
- - 0.13 53 
FTSE-Mid 9.45 
(2.03) ** 
- - -0.90 
(-2.13) ** 
- 0.13 53 
FTSE-Mid 6.50 
(1.46) 
- - - 14.96 
(2.88) ** 
0.18 53 
FTSE-Small 1.80 
(0.52) 
0.06 
(0.24) 
- - - 0.13 53 
FTSE-Small 2.45 
(1.39) 
- 0.89 
(0.81) 
- - 0.14 53 
FTSE-Small 2.49 
(1.40) 
- - 0.04 
(0.23) 
- 0.13 53 
FTSE-Small 1.82 
(1.03) 
- - - 1.30 
(0.61) 
0.10 53 
 
                   Note: ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table VII 
Regression Results (Sub-Period 07/2007 – 04/2014) 
Depend. Var. Intercept MFDIS ESI CCI USI R2 Obs. 
 
Composite -2.51 
(-0.85) 
0.02 
(0.22) 
- - - 0.02 77 
 
Composite -2.92 
(-1.63) 
- 1.35 
(1.72) * 
- - 0.06 77 
 
Composite -2.84 
(-1.55) 
- - -0.13 
(-0.85) 
- 0.03 77 
 
Composite -2.34 
(-1.30) 
- - - 1.85 
(1.28) 
0.02 77 
FTSE20 -2.48 
(-0.98) 
0.02 
(0.35) 
- -  0.00 77 
 
FTSE20 -3.18 
(-2.09) ** 
 1.53 
(2.27) ** 
-  0.07 77 
 
FTSE20 -2.80 
(-1.84) * 
- - -0.32 
(-2.44) ** 
 0.08 77 
 
FTSE20 -2.54 
(-1.73)* 
- - - 3.24 
(2.75)** 
0.09 77 
FTSE-Mid -4.73 
(-0.51) 
-0.01 
(-0.04) 
- -  0.21 77 
 
FTSE-Mid -3.68 
(-0.66) 
- 4.79 
(1.98) * 
-  0.25 77 
 
FTSE-Mid -3.57 
(-0.62) 
- - -0.56 
(-1.13) 
 0.22 77 
 
FTSE-Mid 1.44 
(-0.23) 
- - - 6.17 
(1.21) 
0.02 77 
FTSE-Small -2.50 
(-1.29) 
0.04 
(0.74) 
- -  0.03 57 
 
FTSE-Small -3.44 
(-2.49)** 
- 1.10 
(1.84) * 
-  0.08 57 
 
FTSE-Small -3.04 
(-2.24) ** 
- - -0.25 
(-2.55) ** 
 0.13 57 
 
FTSE-Small -2.95 
(-2.34)** 
- - - 2.46 
(2.64)** 
0.13 57 
 
                   Note: ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table VIII  
Relationship between Sentiment and Stock Returns in Boom and Bust 
Period Movement Intercept (t-stat.) USI R2 Obs. 
 
01/1997 - 12/2000 Up 1.06 (0.56) 1.05 (0.85) 0.04 37 
01/2001 - 03/2003 Down -4.07 (-2.69)* -0.07(-0.05) 0.17 27 
04/2003 - 12/2007 Up 2.18 (2.98)** 1.60 (1.96)* 0.15 60 
01/2008 - 06/2012 Down -5.27 (-2.08)** 2.08(1.13) 0.08 54 
Note: ** and * indicate significance at 5% and 10%, respectively. Composite Index returns and overall 
sentiment are the dependent and independent variables, respectively. 
